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One possible attack in the biometric system is the template stored in the database. This 
attack can cause Biometric template information leakage, thus pose a serious privacy 
security threat. Most available template protection techniques fail to meet all the 
desired requirements of practical biometric systems such as diversity, revocability, 
security,  and performance matching accuracy. This paper aims to review the various 
fingerprint template protection (ftp) approaches that have been proposed by 
researchers in recent decades. Some of the proposed schemes are standard encryption, 
biometric cryptosystem, template transformation, hybrid scheme and homomorphic 
encryption. 




1. INTRODUCTION  
Biometric templates offer a reliable 
approach to user authentication issues in 
identity recognition systems.A wide range 
of biometric technologies are developed 
effectively that include fingerprint, iris, 
face, iris, palms, signature and hand 
geometry.Fingerprints are the most popular 
as they are easily captured, as well as low 
cost sensors and algorithms.The main 
purpose of using fingerprint biometric 
systems is to provide good authentication 
and can not be rejected.Authentication 
implies that  only authorized users be able 
at access logical or physical resources 
protected by finger print systems and  
impostors are prohibited from accessing 
protected resources.From the user's 
perspective, there are two key 
requirements that fingerprint biometric 
system must be fulfilled. First, legitimate 
users should have timely and reliable 
access to protected resources / services. 
Second, biometric systems and personal 
data stored on it should be used only for 
the intended functionality, which is It is 
controlling access to certain resources and 
not for other unintentional purposes [1].  
However, adversary attacks can make 
the biometric system not functioning 
properly according to the above 
requirements. To overcome and protect the 
biometric template information both in the 
process of registration/enrollment and 
authentication in the stored database, some 
techniques have been proposed by the 
researchers include standard encryption, 
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biometric cryptosystem, template 
transformation, hybrid method and 
homomorphic encryption. This paper aims 
to summarize and present information on 
various fingerprint template protection 
techniques. The technique used is 
systematic literature review. The paper is 
organized in the following way. Section 2 
of the paper discusses the attack on 
fingerprint template. Then, Section 3 
presents desirable properties of fingerprint 
template protection. After that, Section 4 
discusses fingerprint template protection 
approaches and Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2. ATTACK ON FINGERPRINT 
TEMPLATE 
The security ensured by the fingerprint 
biometric systems can itself be 
compromised. The general analysis of a 
fingerprint biometric system for 
vulnerability assessment determines the 
extent to which an imposter can 
compromise the security offered by the 
fingerprint biometric system. Many of the 
attacks are applicable to any information in 
fingerprint biometric system , the attacks 
can be using fake fingerprint biometrics 
and template modification are unique to 
biometric systems.  According to Ratha, 
et al. [2] Biometric recognition system has 
some vulnerable point attacks. Attacks that 
may occur in the fingerprint verification 
system is as follows : 
1. Attack at the sensor, A fake biometric 
sample can be presented in a sensor to 
gain access such as a fingerprint trace of 
an object touched by that person. 
2. Replay Attack, There is a possibility of 
the adversary to interpret or obtain a 
digital copy of a stored biometric 
sample and replay this signal that passes 
through the biometric sensor. 
3. Trojan horse attacks,The feature 
extractor can be replaced with a 
program that generates a set of desired 
features. 
4. Spoofing the features, the features 
vector  generated from biometric 
samples are replaced by a set of 
synthetic (fake) features created. 
5. Attack on matcher, the matcher can also 
be subjected to Trojan horse attacks that 
always result in high or low match 
scores regardless of where the user 
presents the biometric on the sensor. 
6. Attack on templates, the templates 
generated during the user enrollment 
can be stored locally or in network 
location that modify the saved template 
or replace it with a new template. 
7. Attacks on communication channels, 
Data transferred through a 
communication channel can be 
intercepted for malicious reasons and 
modified and reinserted into the system. 
8. Attack on the decision module, The 
final decision generated by the 
biometric system can be replaced by the 
Trojan horse program. 
 
Biometric matching is usually only part 
of a larger information and information 
security management system. Thus the 
non-biometric module in the whole system 
can also introduce some security flaws. 
There are several techniques to disrupt 
attacks at various points. For example, 
sensing a finger conductivity or pulse can 
stop a simple attack on the sensor. 
Encrypted communication channel [3] can 
eliminate at least remote attack on 
synthesized feature factor and override 
final decision. The simplest way to stop 
attacks at override matcher, attacking the 
channel and modify template in database is 
to have the matcher and database reside in 
a secure location. Storing templates in a 
smartcard that a user brings with them to 
the point of service can also eliminate 





Fig. 1 Possible attack in fingerprint template protection 
 
3. DESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF 
FINGERPRINT TEMPLATE 
PROTECTION (FTP) 
The performance of biometric template 






ginformation. Operational performance can 
be evaluated with the independence of 
modality, interoperability, and Quality of 
Performance. Technical performance can 
be evaluated with accuracy, throughput, 
storage requirements [5].There are four 
major requirement when a biometric 
template protection algorithm is design:[6] 
A. Revocability: When the biometric 
template is compromised, it should be 
possible to revoke the compromised 
template and reissue a new template 
based on the biometric trait. 
B. Diversity: The cross-matching of a 
secured templates should be ensured in 
such a manner that the privacy of the true 
owner of the template should be ensured. 
C. Security - It should be extremely 
difficult to generate the original 
biometric feature set from the protected 
biometric templates. 
D. Performance: The biometric template 
protection techniques developed should 
not decrease the accuracy of the 
recognition system. 
4. FINGERPRINT TEMPLATE 
PROTECTION (FTP) 
APPROACHES 
The major fingerprint template 
protection schemes can be categorized into 
standard encryption, biometrics  
cryptosystem, template transformation, 
hybrid methods, and homomorphic 
encryption such as shown in Figure 2. Each 
of schemes will discussed detail in the 
following sections. 
A. Standard Encryption 
The easiest way to secure fingerprint 
templates is by encrypting them using 
standard cryptographic techniques like 
RSA, DES and AES. This is the 
methodology used in most commercial 
biometric systems. However, it must be 
emphasized that some acquisitions with the 
same biometric properties do not produce 
the same feature set. Typically, the 
standard encryption function is not smooth 
function and a small difference in the 
feature set values extracted from raw 
biometric data will result in a huge 
difference in the resulting encrypted 
features. Consequently, one can not 
perform biometric matching directly in an 
encrypted domain. Instead, the template 
should be decrypted to match the query 
feature. As a result, the original biometric 
feature is exposed during each 
authentication attempt, irrespective of 















































whether the authentication is eventually 
successful. Therefore, the encryption 
solution is secure revocable only under 
ideal conditions (key is kept secret and 
matching is done at a trusted location). If 
practical issues such as key management or 
susceptibility to template theft during a 
matching attempt are taken into account, 
the standard encryption technique is not 













Fig. 2  A hierarchical taxonomy of FTP 
B. Biometric Cryptosystem 
In the biometric cryptosystems data 
information about the biometric template, 
called helper data , and stored in the 
database [8]. The data helper does not show 
important informationgabout the 
originalgbiometrictemplategbut is needed 
when matching the cryptographic key of the 
query biometric feature. Matching is done 
indirectly by verifying the truth of the 
extracted key. Errorgcorrectiongcoding 
techniques are usually used to handle 
intra-user variations. Biometric 
cryptosystemsgofferghigh security but, not 
designedgto provide diversitygand 
revocability. Cryptosystem biometrics are 
grouped into key bindinggand key 
generationg systems based on howgthe 
helper data derivedg[6].Some of the 
techniques in this category are fuzzy vault, 
biometric encryption and fuzzy 
commitments. 





[10]. Thisgbiometricgencryptiongwas not 
practical because of mismatch between 
accuracy and security. Then, the next key 
binding is fuzzy vault. Fuzzy vault is 
cryptography designed to work with 
biometric features that are represented as 
minutiae in fingerprints. The advantage of 
the fuzzy vault scheme is the ability to 
control the amount of security imparted to 
protected biometric templates by 
increasing the number of chaff points and 
consequently the difficulty of the 
polynomial reconstruction problem. Even 
though its popularity, analysis of the fuzzy 
vault scheme has indicated that this 
approach has several  drawbacks. Chang, 
et al. [11] present observations to 
differentiate minutiae from chaffgpoints 
 
5 
attacking fuzzy vaults based on 
fingerprints. Since the chaff points are 
made one by one, it created later tend 
reveal smaller empty surroundingg areas 
which is verified experimentally, i.e., the 
security of a fuzzy vault highly relies on 
the methodologygof generating chaff 
points. 
Scheirer and Boult [12] discussed the 
vulnerability of fuzzy vaults to three 
potential attacks, namely, surreptitious 
key-inversion (SKI) attacks , blended 
substitution attacks  and attacks via 
record multiplicity (ARM). The authors 
suggest that a fuzzy vault is particularly 
vulnerable to ARM attacks, where access 
to two or more fuzzy vaults generated from 
the same biometric data, but with different 
keys and chaff points, would enable an 
adversary to easily identify the original 
points in the two vault and thus decode the 
vault. 
Therefore, the fuzzy vault approaches 
does not gave diversity and revocability. 
This means that, if a fuzzy vault is 
compromised, a new vault cannot be 
created from the same biometric data by 
simply binding it with a different key. 
Furthermore, the vulnerability of fuzzy 
vaults to ARM attacks allows 
cross-matching of templates across 
different systems, thereby user privacy is 
not ensured [13]. In a stolen key-inversion 
attack, if an attacker is able to recover the 
secret key embedded in the fuzzy vault (for 
example, through snooping), the secret 
polynomial may be directly reconstructed; 
thereby, the unprotected biometric 
template can be easily separated from the 
chaff points. A blended substitution attack 
is straightforward if an adversary is able to 
modify an existing fuzzy vault. In this 
attack, an impostor takes advantage of the 
myriad chaff points existing in the fuzzy 
vault to substitute some of these random 
points with his or her own biometric data, 
in which case both the legitimate user and 
the impostor would be able to be identified 
using the same fuzzy vault. Kholmatov and 
Yanikoglu [14] extended Scheirer and 
Boult [12] presenting experimental 
evidence that confirms a fuzzy vault‟s 
vulnerability to record multiplicity 
(correlation) attacks. 
Nandakumar, et al. [13] further mention 
the possibility of exploiting the 
non-uniform nature of biometric features to 
launch an attack on a fuzzy vault based on 
statistical analysis of points in the vault. 
The authors also note the vulnerability of a 
fuzzy vault to attacks during the 
authentication stage, where a genuine 
user‟s original template is temporarily 
exposed and therefore vulnerable to 
snooping [15]. 
Another liability of the fuzzy vault 
scheme is the considerable increase in 
biometric template size as a result of the 
addition of a large number of chaff points. 
This may be undesirable in recognition 
systems that require a small template size. 
Furthermore, recognition accuracy may be 
adversely affected as a result of the large 
number of false points or too few true 
points in the protected template. For 
example, Clancy, et al. [16] 
implementation of the fuzzy vault on 
minutiae fingerprint  showed an 
unacceptably high FRR of 20-30%. 
Furhermore, key binding Fuzzy 
commitment Simoens, et al. [5] is a 
biometric cryptosystemgthat can begused 
to secure biometric traits representedgin 
the form of binary vectors. This 
characteristic of fuzzy commitment 
scheme makes it useful for applications 
biometric authenticationgsystems, in which 
data is subject to random noise. Because 
thegscheme is tolerantgof error, it is 
capable of protecting biometric data such 
as conventional cryptographic techniques, 
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such as hashgfunctions, are used to protect 
alphanumericgpasswords[17]. 
In the key 
generationgbiometricgcryptosystems,the 
helper data is generated only from 
biometric templates and cryptographic keys 
directly generated from helper data and 
query biometric features. The direct key 
generation of biometrics is an attractive 
template-protectiongapproach that can be 
very usefulgincryptographicgapplications. 
Nevertheless, it is problematic to generate a 
key that could funding at the same time 
high stability and entropy due to 
intra-usergvariationgin the template. It’s 
hard to develop a scheme that generates the 
same key for different templates of the 
same person and at the same time very 
different keys for different persons. E.g. 
quantization schemes and secure sketch. 
In the quantization scheme method, 
helpergdata is quantized togobtain a 
stablegkey. This scheme takes feature 
vectors from multiple biometric samples 
and gets feature element intervals. The 
interval is encodedgandgthengstored in 
helpergdata. Throughout authentication, 
biometricgfeaturesaregcalculated and 
mappedgtodeterminedgintervals. Several 
studies in this method such as [18] use the 
DividegandgConquermethodgforfingerprin
tgimages, and bio keys are 
generatedgusingminutiag set. Yang, et al. 
[19] proposed a fingerprintgcryptosystem 
by modifyinggVoronoiNeighbor Structure 
(VNS). In the same year, Yang, et al. [20] 
focused on the using of "Delaunay 
Quadrangle-based fingerprint 
authentication system that uses topological 
code for local enrollment and security 
enhancements."  
C. Template Transformation 
In this approach, the transformation 
function algorithm (F) is applied to the 
biometric template (T) and the result is 
stored in the database. The transformation 
function parameter usually comes from a 
random key (K) or password. The 
matching process is performed on the 
transformed domain. The feature 
transformation approach scheme can be 
further categorized as salting or 
non-invertible transforms.The security of 
salting schemes is based on the secrecy of 
the key or password. While, the security of 
non-invertible transformation techniques 
uses one way functions computationally 
difficult to invert, even if the key is known. 
Nevertheless, the disadvantage of these 
techniques is that security of the system is 
very difficult to verify due there is no 
foundation of mathematical to perform a 
robust security analysis and it is assumed 
that the distribution of uniform biometric 
features [21] and enemies may be able to 
utilize non-uniform biometric properties to 
launch attacks that may require less effort 
to compromise system security. 
 Salting 
Salting is a an approach used two-factor 
authentication scheme, in which an 
unprotected biometric template is 
transformed into a protected template via a 
function Specified by an external key or a 
user-specific keyword. Because 
transformations can be reversed for the 
most part, keys must be kept or 
remembered securely by the user and 
presented during authentication. The need 
for additional information is the key to 
improving entropy from biometric 
templates and therefore making it difficult 
for opponents to guess templates [6]. 
The limitations of the salting approach is 
that the security of this scheme depend on 
the secrecy of the key or password [15, 22].  
As a result, effective key management 
procedures must be put into place, or else 
the user is obliged to memorise the secret 
key; however, relying on users‟ memory 
for the protection of complex secret keys 
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re-introduces the weakness of 
password-based schemes that we are trying 
to circumvent . Since matching is 
performed directly in the transformed 
domain, the salting functions must be 
designed such that they do not have an 
adverse effect on the recognition 
performance. This becomes especially 
important in the presence of large 
intra-user variations. Salting methods 
generally use quantization to deal with 
intra-user variability during matching in 
the transformed domain. 
Several studies related to fingerprint 
salting approach will be discussed below. 
Teoh et al [23] introduced the bio phasor 
technique. This method is the 
pseudo-randomgnumbergmixing iteration 
with the fingerprintgfeature. Thisgwork is 
considered a stolengkeyg scenario. Then,  
Jin, et al. [24] proposed salting 
biohashing. The biohashing procedure 
was initially proposed for the fingerprint 
modality, and it consists of two stages. 
Firstly, the extracted fingerprint feature 
vector is transformed into a translation, 
rotation, and scale invariant feature set, 
employing the Wavelet Fourier-Mellin 
Transform (WFMT)
2
. Secondly, the 
resulting data is discretised via an inner 
product computation between the 
invariant feature vector and a tokenised 
pseudorandom number sequence. The 
second stage of this process produces the 
protected biometric template vector, 
which is referred to as a BioHash. 
The Biohashing procedure has been 
proven to be advantageous in several 
ways. Firstly, biohashing simultaneously 
provides high intra-class variation and 
extremely low inter-class correlation, 
which essentially leads to an Equal Error 
Rate (EER) of zero (when the legitimate 
token is used). This means that the 
occurrence of a False Accept is 
eliminated without a corresponding 
increase in the FRR  [25]. It has also 
been claimed that Biohashing has a high 
tolerance to data capture offsets, such that 
the same biometric trait acquired at 
different times will produce highly 
correlated bit strings (BioHashes) [24]. 
This is due to the invariance of the feature 
vector created during the first stage of the 
Biohashing process, as well as the 
subsequent discretization of the invariant 
feature vector in the second stage. 
Another advantage of Biohashing is that it 
addresses the problem of irrevocability of 
biometric features: a user‟s compromised 
BioHash can be easily revoked and 
replaced with a new one by using a 
different secret seed for 
enrolment.However, Biohasing schemes 
have weaknesses that have been presented 
by researchers. The most commonly 
analysed limitation of the Biohashing 
approach is the degradation in matching 
performance when an adversary has 
access to a user‟s secret key (seed) and 
uses the legitimate key with their own 
biometric features in order to fool the 
system into authenticating them [26]. 
Several researchers have presented 
methods for resolving  performance 
degradation resulting from a stolen-token 
scenario, such as [27-29]. Beacuse a 
salting approach is by nature invertible, 
almost no any existing literary works 
focus on improving the non-invertibility 
property of Biohashing; however, there 
are two suggestions are presented in [30, 
31]. In fact, Biohashing on its own 
technically cannot be made to be 
noninvertible. A hybrid protection 
scheme, incorporating techniques other 
than salting, would be required; for 
example, applying Biohashing to a 
non-invertible template. Other salting 
techniques, which do not adopt 
Biohashing, are also available in the 
literature; such as [32, 33]. 
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 Non-Invertible Transform 
One-way functions applied to biometric 
data. To update biometric templates, 
function parameters must be changed. In 
case the transformed parameters are 
compromised the attacker can not 
reconstruct the original biometric template. 
Because of intra-class variations, 
transformations need to align biometric 
templates to perform effective comparisons 
and this leads to reduced authentication 
performance. A non-invertible transform 
shows the impossibility on obtaining the 
original biometric data from its 
transformed version. 
Thegparametersgofgthegtransformationgfu
nction are specified by a key, but 
knowledge of the key and/or the 
transformed template does not facilitate 
recovery of the original biometric template 
[6, 34]. 
The major advantage of the non-invertible 
transform scheme approach compared to 
the salting approach, and it means that 
biometric templates that are protected 
using non-invertible transforms are 
generally more secure than those protected 
using the salting approach. Then, a related 
advantage of the non-invertible transform 
approach is that, unlike salting, it does not 
require storage of any secret information. 
The next positive aspect of non-invertible 
transforms is that they tend to leave the 
protected biometric template in the same 
feature space s its unprotected counterpart. 
In this case, intra-user variations in the 
transformed biometric templates can be 
robustly handled by using existing, 
sophisticated matchers, thereby reducing 
the error rates of the biometric system [35]. 
Furthermore, the matching scores obtained 
are proportional to those obtained in the 
original space, and thus can be used in the 
design of a secure multibiometric system 
through a scoreline-level fusion method. 
The main limitation of the non-invertible 
transformation method lies in the difficulty 
of designing a good one-way function. The 
transformation function must ensure that 
the biometric features from the same user 
maintain a high similarity in the 
transformed space, while features from 
different users are completely unrelated 
after transformation. However, the 
transformation must also be non-invertible, 
so that an adversary is unable to collect 
any information about the original 
biometric template from its protected 
counterpart. There is a trade-off between 
discriminability and non-invertibility, since 
it is challenging to design transform 
functions that satisfy both requirements 
simultaneously. 
Consequently, often the greater the amount 
of distortion applied to the original 
biometric data by the transformation, the 
worse the recognition performance among 
the protected biometric templates. This 
means that the non-invertible transform 
approach typically suffers from a security 
versus performance trade-off. Furthermore, 
the transformation function relies heavily 
on biometric features to be used in specific 
applications. This analysis makes evident a 
clear comparison between the salting and 
non-invertible transform approaches. 
While salting schemes (such as 
BioHashing) generally tend to either 
preserve or improve the recognition 
performance of the biometric system into 
which they are incorporated, non-invertible 
transforms often have the effect of 
degrading the recognition accuracy 
somewhat. On the other hand, 
non-invertible transforms tend to impart 
more security to the protected biometric 
templates compared to salting approaches, 
which are invertible with the revelation of 
the user-specific key. 
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In this scheme,the most influential 
researcher are Ratha, et al. [36]. They 
proposed and analyzed cancelable 
biometrics fingerprint using non-invertible 
transforms for generating fingerprint 
templates. The scheme of cancelable 
biometrics is to change the raw biometric 
templates by using either feature or signal 
domain transformations. Cartesian, polar 
and functional are the three functions of 
the transformation. These functions used to 
transform fingerprint minutiae data so that 
a minutiae matcher can still be applied to 
the transformed minutiae.  
For the functional transformation, Ratha, et 
al. [37] used a mixture of 2D Gaussians 
and electric potential field in a 2D random 
charge distribution as a means to translate 
the minutia points. Research with the same 
technique is also done by Yang, et al. [38] 
who developed a non-invertible 
transformation for fingerprints by 
considering local and global features of 
minutia points. The distance between the 
minutiae pair is projected vertically to the 
circle. Later, Lee and Kim [39] proposed a 
new representation of the minutiae points  
of the fingerprint image made using bit 
strings. Minutia points of the fingerprint 
image are mapped to a 3D array that is 
divided into small cells. A string of bits is 
generated by finding which cells include 
minutiae points. Subsequent research 
conducted by Zhe and Jin [40], they 
proposed the protection of a fingerprint 
template obtained using a projected MVD 
feature at random. Ahmad, et al. [41] 
introduced a pair of polar relationships of 
minutiae. The correlation-based filter 
method using chip matching  was 
proposed by Takahashi and Hirata [42]. 
Wang and Hu [43] proposed the Densely 
Infinite To One Mapping (DITOM) 
approach use of Correlation Invariant 
Random Filtering (CIRF). Das, et al. [44] 
meant a method based on the Minimum 
Distance graph. The hashing algorithm is 
constructed using this graph and an 
appropriate search algorithm is used to 
match the resulting hash. Ferrara, et al. [45] 
making the non-invertible Cylinder 
Minutiae Code (pMCC) for fingerprints as 
a fingerprint enhancement enhancement 
fingerprint.. 
D. Hybrid Methods 
Several fingerprint template protection 
schemes  used combination of feature 
transformation and biometric 
cryptosystems. Usually it called hybrid 
methods. Several hybrid system examples 
are presented in the literature, some of 
which even incorporate traditional 
cryptographic hashing functions into the 
hybrid protection system. For Example  
hardening a fingerprint-based fuzzy vault 
with a user-specific password, combined 
key binding with salting  [13]. An 
application-specific key release scheme that 
retrieves a cryptographic key bound to a 
BioHashed fingerprint, combined salting 
with key binding methods [46]. 
In addition, Several studies that have 
been done in fingerprint template protection 
based on hybrid scheme are Boult, et al. [47] 
presented revocable biotokens for 
fingerprint  biometrics. This technique 
divides data into two parts fractional and 
integer parts. The fractional part performs 
the transformation and the integer part is 
encrypted.. The fractional part does the 
transformation and integer part is encrypted. 
Then, Feng, et al. [48] also developed a 
three-step hybrid algorithm based on 
random projection, 
discriminability-preserving (DP) transform, 
and fuzzy commitment scheme. In similar 
way, Nagar, et al. [30] constructing a hybrid 
cryptosystem with minutiae descriptors for 
fingerprints. This work used both fuzzy 
vault and fuzzy commitment scheme to 
build the cryptosystem. The helper data 
extraction  involves fuzzy vault encoding 
and the ordinate values secured by fuzzy 
commitment. 
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 Furthermore, Chin, et al. [49] proposed 
a hybrid system using fingerprint and 
palmprint features, then Sandhya and 
Prasad [50] constructed Delaunay triangles 
from fingerprint minutiae. The features are 
transformed and then a cryptosystem was 
built using fuzzy commitment scheme. 
Convolution code was used to generate the 
error correction code. Finally, Jin, et al. [51] 
proposed a long ECC free key-binding 
scheme with a cancelable transforms for 
minutia-based fingerprint biometrics. The 
minutiae information is secured by a strong 
noninvertible cancelable transform called 
modified Randomized Graph based 
Hamming Embedding. The advantage of 
hybrid protection schemes is that they can 
combine the high revocability and diversity 
properties characteristic of feature 
transformation approaches with the high 
security offered by biometric 
cryptosystems [6].After the text edit has 
been completed, the paper is ready for the 
template. Duplicate the template file by 
using the Save As command, and use the 
naming convention prescribed by your 
conference for the name of your paper. In 
this newly created file, highlight all of the 
contents and import your prepared text file. 
You are now ready to style your paper; use 
the scroll down window on the left of the 
MS Word Formatting toolbar. 
E. Homomorphic Encryption 
Another alternative, apart from the above 
4 methods is homomorphic encryption. 
This technique allows a limited subset of 
calculations on encrypted data. Combining 
Homomorphic Encryption with a biometric 
recognition system will meet the 
requirements of Biometric Template 
Protection without degrading the accuracy 
[52]. The fingerprint template protection 
study under the Homomorphic Encryption 
scheme was developed at Rane et al. [53] 
They presented the calculation of 
Hamming distance for fingerprint 
applications. Then, Barni, et al. [54] shows 
distributed biometric systems by utilizing 
cryptosystems, homomorphic encryption 
on Fingercode templates in a semi-honest 
model. 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
WORK 
This paper provides and summarizes 
information about research issues related to 
fingerprint template protection. Based on a 
survey of 54 papers conducted it can be 
concluded that there are 5 techniques that 
can be done to solve the problem of 
fingerprint template protection that is 
encryption standard, biometric 
cryptosystem, template transformation, 
hybrid methods and homomorphic 
encryption. Then there  has not been the 
best approach to template protection that 
actually meets the main requirements of 
template security, revocability. diversity 
and performance matching accuracy. 
Application requirements and user-desired 
scenarios play a key role in the selection of 
template protection schemes. 
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